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Abstract 
The debate on effects of economic globalization on welfare states is extensive. A prominent hypothesis is that generous 
welfare policies buffer the negative externalities of globalization, but recent empirical evidence confirms a negative 
association between globalization and public social spending. Attempting to reconcile these conflicting findings, we broaden 
the perspective by investigating not only the impact of globalization on traditional compensatory social policies (e.g., 
unemployment benefits) but also on future-oriented social investments (e.g., education). We argue that instead of 
demanding compensation for globalization-induced job-loss ex post, people try avoiding unemployment ex ante by 
demanding increased skill-investments. We find a positive association between globalization and individual-level demand for 
public spending on education, but not for unemployment. Nevertheless, we show that this demand is not translated into 
policy output. Thus, a potential mismatch between popular demand for and supply of welfare is revealed, which challenges 
conventional wisdom in the policy responsiveness literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Although it has been going on for a long time, the debate on the impact of economic globalization on 
the welfare state is far from being settled. Often couched in terms of a battle between the 
compensation and the efficiency thesis, the scholarly literature has provided contradictory arguments 
and findings on this complex association. On the one hand, globalization might increase popular 
demand for compensatory social policies so that highly open economies are often found to be the 
ones with the largest welfare states (e.g., Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands). On the other 
hand, competition between nation-states for mobile capital might delimit the governments’ leeway to 
increase revenues via taxation and therefore depress levels of public social spending. The existing 
empirical evidence is mixed (see references below). 
We aim to contribute to the somewhat deadlocked theoretical and empirical discussions on 
the “compensation vs. efficiency” arguments in two respects. Firstly, we argue that instead of focusing 
on compensatory social policies (typically: unemployment benefits) as is usually done in the literature, 
we should broaden the analytical perspective by studying the impact of globalization on social 
investment policies (e.g., education) in addition to classical transfer programs. We hypothesize that 
rather than demanding compensation for globalization-related income losses ex post, individuals in 
open economies are more likely to demand support for updating their (or their children’s) skills, as 
well as the general level of human capital in the economy, in order to avoid unemployment in the first 
place. The neglect of human capital investments in the existing literature might be one reason why the 
empirical evidence on the globalization-welfare nexus is so mixed.  
The second contribution of our paper is that the compensation and the efficiency arguments 
can actually be combined when distinguishing between public demand for policies, on the one hand, 
and the ability of policy-makers to supply these policies, on the other. Following compensation theory, 
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we posit that public welfare demand is higher in open economies. Nevertheless, we also argue that 
this demand does not necessarily translate into policy output: Efficiency pressures constrain policy-
makers, who are increasingly unable to meet the public’s demand for additional welfare. By 
distinguishing demand for and supply of welfare policies, many seemingly contradicting findings can 
be explained. While we are not the first to notice this possibility to reconcile both theories (see Brady 
et al. 2007; Cerny 1997; Genschel 2004; Hays 2009; Hicks 1999; Rodrik 1997), this argument is not 
prominent in the literature and – more importantly – has not been systematically tested yet. 
In order to probe these two claims, we conduct empirical analyses on two levels: First, we use 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data and compare the impact of economic globalization 
on individual-level preferences towards public unemployment and education spending. From the 
perspective of conventional compensation theory, economic globalization should evoke individual-
level demand for unemployment spending; we find, however, that – in line with our social investment 
argument – individuals in open economies demand public investments in human capital formation. 
In a second step, we investigate whether policy-makers meet this demand for provision via social 
investment. Here, we analyze the relationship between economic globalization and government 
spending across three welfare policy fields in time-series cross-section (TSCS) regressions, finding that 
the effects vary substantially across domains: In the case of compensatory policies (i.e. passive 
unemployment spending), we find some support for a negative association in line with the efficiency 
argument (cf. also Busemeyer 2009a; Jahn 2006). In the case of education, however, there is no 
robust association: Globalization neither increases nor decreases education spending. These findings 
suggest concluding that we observe an increasing mismatch between public demand for and actual 
supply of welfare. In the concluding section, we speculate on the implications of this finding for the 
future of the welfare state and representative democracy. 
In what follows, we briefly discuss the existing literature (section 2) and introduce our 
argument (section 3). Section 4 reports empirical results on the impact of globalization on individual-
level demand for public spending. Section 5 provides TSCS-regression results for the supply-side. We 
close by summarizing and discussing our findings and by pointing out broader implications. 
 
2. Demand for and supply of welfare: Reconciling contradicting perspectives  
There is a huge literature on the relationship between economic globalization and the welfare state 
(for overviews, see e.g. Brady et al. 2007; Genschel 2004; Hays 2009), which can be roughly divided 
into three camps: A first group of scholars could be named globalization skeptics (Castles 2004; 
Iversen 2001; Iversen/Cusack 2000). In their view, other socio-economic processes such as 
deindustrialization and skill-biased technological change are more important driving forces of welfare 
state development than economic globalization. Moreover, they claim that the politics of welfare 
state expansion and retrenchment play out in the arena of domestic politics and that constraints 
supposedly imposed by the dynamics of economic internationalization are much less binding than 
assumed (see also Swank 1998, 2002). 
In contrast, two other strands of literature agree that globalization has significant effects on 
welfare states, but expect effects in opposite directions: The compensation thesis, going back to work 
by Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985), posits that economic globalization leads to an increase in 
popular demand for social insurance, because individual workers exposed to the vagaries of 
international markets perceive amplified economic insecurity (Scheve/Slaughter2004) and demand 
compensation via the welfare state (more recent contributions are Garrett 1998; Rodrik 1997, 1998). 
The so-called efficiency thesis states the opposite view (Kurzer 1991; Scharpf 1991): Economic 
globalization is believed to constrain public spending in general and on welfare in particular because 
competition for mobile capital triggers a “race to the bottom” between nation-states (Genschel 2002): 
As firms in internationalized markets can credibly threaten to withdraw capital, governments are 
expected to react to these threats by decreasing the firms’ costs, especially taxes. Decreasing tax 
revenues, in turn, make cuts in (social) spending more likely.  
The empirical evidence on the macro-level is mixed (Benarroch/Pandey 2012; Brady et al. 
2005; Brady et al. 2007; Burgoon 2001; Garrett 1998, 2001; Garrett/Mitchell 2001). Some scholars 
confirm the existence of a positive association between economic globalization and welfare state 
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generosity (Garrett 1998; Garrett 2001; Rodrik 1998), whereas others find support for the efficiency 
thesis (Busemeyer 2009a; Jahn 2006; Marshall/Fisher 2015). More recently, scholars argued that one 
way of reconciling the competing claims is to think of the effect of globalization as variable over time: 
The nature (or intensity) of economic globalization might have changed at some point in time. Hicks 
(1999), for example, argued that the effect of globalization on welfare spending is curvilinear, initially 
contributing to spending increases, but exerting downward pressure after a certain threshold is 
reached. In this vein, Jahn (2006) points to the late 1980s as a potential breaking point. Moreover, the 
effects of globalization may simply take more time to materialize, as Busemeyer (2009a) hypothesizes. 
Probing the impact of openness on public spending in a series of cross-sectional regressions, he finds a 
positive association in the early 1980s, but this association turned negative in the later period. 
Recent scholarship also significantly expands our knowledge about the micro-foundations of 
the globalization-welfare nexus. Scheve and Slaughter (2004) prepare the ground by showing that – as 
compensation theory assumes – globalization increases individuals’ perception of economic insecurity. 
Taking this argument further, Walter (2010b) analyzes the impact of openness on individual social 
policy and partisan preferences. She shows, supporting compensation theory, how exposure to 
international competition makes individuals more likely to demand social insurance and that this 
demand in turn affects partisan choices during elections. 
What remains underdeveloped here, however, is the link between individual preferences and 
policy output (i.e. welfare state generosity and/or spending). Individuals supporting redistribution may 
be more likely to vote for leftist parties, but whether leftwing parties pick up this demand at all and 
whether they, once in government, can actually deliver in terms of policies is an entirely different 
matter. Burgoon (2012) provides some support for the former aspect, finding that leftwing parties 
place more emphasis on pro-welfare issues when globalization intensifies.  
 In sum, while we have three rival theories making very clear predictions for the effect of 
globalization on welfare states, the empirical results are inconclusive on the macro-level. On the 
micro-level of individual attitudes, support for the compensation argument seems more robust. The 
latter point, however, should not be mistaken for unequivocal support for the compensation theory as 
a whole, because its underlying (and often implicit) assumption is that public preferences are in fact 
related to changes in policy output (Brooks/Manza 2006, 2007; Rehm 2012). The efficiency theory, in 
contrast, does not claim that reductions in government spending are driven by individual preferences. 
Instead, the underlying mechanism – though often underdeveloped – models constraints on policy-
making related to the increased power of business in a globalized world.  
Hence, it might well be the case that individuals demand more compensation in reaction to 
globalization, but that policy-makers are increasingly unable to deliver this because of the very 
constraints that globalization imposes on them. Governments might be unable to meet the greater 
demand for welfare spending for two reasons: First, voter preferences in this field might be less 
important for policy-makers compared to the influence of organized interests (Culpepper 2010). 
Policy-makers face the voter only every couple of years and even then, the election agenda is typically 
overcrowded. The contrasting perspective to this is provided by Wlezien (1995) who suggests that 
policy-makers might be very responsive to popular demands, in particular when a certain issue is 
suddenly highly salient and receives a lot of public attention (Breunig 2011; Culpepper 2010; Rehm 
2012; Soroka/Wlezien 2010).  
A second reason why popular demands may not directly translate into policy output is that 
policy-makers are constrained in their choices, e.g. by globalization. Kittel and Obinger (2003) as well 
as Kwon and Pontusson (2010) show convincingly that partisan effects on public spending have largely 
disappeared in the recent period of intensified globalization (at least in countries where labor is 
weakly organized), which can be interpreted as indirect evidence of the constraining power of 
economic internationalization.  
Thus, by disentangling demand for and supply of public welfare, the apparent contradictions 
between both theories can be reconciled to a certain extent. Hence, the first contribution of our paper 
is to emphasize that compensation and efficiency theory are less mutually exclusive than usually 
assumed. Although this is, at least to us, a very straightforward conclusion, it is not prominent in the 
literature yet with a few exceptions (Brady et al. 2007; Cerny 1997; Genschel 2004; Hays 2009; Rodrik 
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1997). Moreover, and much more importantly, it has not been systematically tested yet whether 
globalization on the one hand increases demand for and on the other hand limits supply of public 
welfare. 
 
3. Demand for compensation and social investment policies 
As a second contribution to the literature, we go beyond existing work by exploring the effects of 
globalization on a crucial policy-aspect that has received surprisingly little attention so far: the role of 
social investment policies in general and of education policies in particular in cushioning potentially 
negative effects of globalization. The existing literature on the micro-level implications of 
compensation theory, primarily Walter (2010b), focuses on support for redistribution in general or 
more specifically on support for traditional compensatory social policies, especially unemployment 
benefits. The potentially crucial importance of human capital investment as a political strategy to cope 
with globalization-pressures is disregarded in these studies. As we show below, there are, however, 
strong reasons why we should find substantial effects here. 
The literature on the political and institutional determinants of educational investments at the 
macro-level in OECD countries (Ansell 2008b, 2010; Boix 1997, 1998; Busemeyer 2007, 2009b; Castles 
1989, 1998; Garritzmann/Seng 2016; Schmidt 2007; Wolf/Zohlnhöfer 2009), in turn, does not analyze 
economic globalization as a prime independent variable either. Ansell and Busemeyer provide some 
initial evidence of a positive association between education and trade openness, but the causal 
mechanisms behind these associations remain underdeveloped and the evidence is not conclusive (cf. 
also Garritzmann/Seng 2016). The most elaborated contribution in this literature is by Boix (1997, 
1998), who argues that globalization triggers a shift in the policies pursued by social democratic 
governments from Keynesian demand-side policies to supply-side instruments, such as public 
investments in education1.   
Moving beyond the existing literature on the effects of globalization on the micro-level of 
policy attitudes and preferences, we posit that compared to traditional social transfer programs, 
globalization might have even stronger effects on support for social investment policies, particularly 
education policy. Whereas unemployment insurance offers compensation for the negative side effects 
of globalization ex-post, we find it much more likely that individuals might favor a more pro-active 
approach of insuring against trade-induced labor market risks by means of human capital investments.  
This is for at least three reasons: First, rather than demanding compensation for globalization-related 
job-losses, working-age individuals might be interested in upgrading and updating their skills via 
further training in order to prevent job-loss ex ante.2 Hence, skill-investment might be preferred as an 
effective insurance policy against labor market risk compared to ex-post compensation through 
transfer payments.3 Secondly, parents can be expected to demand educational investments in order 
to ensure that their children are able to deal with the challenges of internationalized labor markets. 
This is particularly likely in the skill-intensive and skill-abundant labor markets of the advanced 
economies (on which we focus). On the societal level, finally, individuals might believe that expanding 
and improving their country’s stock of human capital is more likely to contribute to continued growth 
than investing in passive transfer payments – particularly so in the ‘age of the knowledge-economy’ 
where public discourses continuously emphasize the (rising) importance of skills.  
We hypothesize that the effects of economic globalization percolate from the macro to the 
micro-level rather than being confined to the micro-level only. To clarify, we argue that differences in 
                                                        
1 There is actually more work on the positive association between globalization and educational investments in the context of 
developing countries (Ansell 2008a; Benarroch/Pandey 2012; Rudra/Haggard 2005; Stasavage 2005), which is however of 
limited relevance for the purposes of this paper, since it is mostly concerned with low-income and often non-democratic 
countries. 
2
 As an illustration of the argument, consider how the “Great Recession” has affected (some) people’s educational decisions: 
While systematic studies are still missing, initial evidence on the U.S. shows that the economic downturn increased 
enrollment in higher education institutions by 6.8 percent (Longmire and Company, Inc. 2008; Mullin/Philippe 2009). While 
still sketchy and country-specific, this evidence illustrates how economic insecurity, especially fears to loose one’s job, 
creates incentives to re-skill. From here, it is only a small step to reason that globalization, which can have tremendous 
effects on economic insecurity (Scheve/Slaughter 2004), affects public demand for education. 
3
 For a related analysis regarding deindustrialization see Jensen (2011).  
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(changes in) openness across countries are more important than individual-level exposure to 
globalization pressures. Individuals in open (opening) economies are expected to demand more social 
investment on average compared to individuals in closed (closing) economies, independent of 
whether they themselves work in the sheltered or exposed sector. This logic is somewhat different 
from Walter’s (2010a, 2010b) approach, which identifies the individual’s exposure to globalization as a 
crucial determinant of redistributive preferences. While we see the logic of her argument, we believe 
that the macro-level context in a given political economy is more important for the reasons outlined 
above: Even if they themselves are not directly affected by globalization, individuals in open 
economies will most likely favor social investments in order to maintain the competitiveness of their 
children and/or the economy as a whole. This is because they might realize that their jobs in sheltered 
parts of the economy (e.g. in the public sector) ultimately also depend on the competitiveness of the 
open sectors. Furthermore, individuals in open economies are more likely to demand educational 
investments for their children since chances are high that they will end up in open sections of the 
economy later on. Finally, we believe that a too strong focus on individual exposure to globalization 
underestimates the linkages between individuals in households. In the case of Scandinavian countries, 
for instance, a typical pattern of labor market segmentation is that women work in the sheltered 
public sector, whereas men work in the exposed private economy. 
 Summing up, we make two main claims: First, we extend compensation theory by 
differentiating between several welfare policies: Rather than demanding higher public spending on 
compensatory social policies (i.e. unemployment benefits), we expect increases in demand for 
forward-looking social investments such as education. Second, we question the prevailing argument in 
parts of the literature that public demand for social policies will more or less automatically be 
translated into commensurate policy output (Brooks/Manza 2006, 2007; Rehm 2012). Instead, we 
argue that intensified economic internationalization in recent years has increasingly constrained 
governments’ abilities to react to higher levels of public demand for compensation and social 
investment.   
In order to substantiate these claims empirically, we engage in analyses of individual-level 
preferences, utilizing survey data, as well as in analyses of policy-output, exploiting public spending 
data. We begin by testing our arguments on the individual-level and investigate the impact of 
economic globalization on preferences towards public education and unemployment spending. As a 
second step, we investigate whether economic globalization affects policy-output and concentrate on 
public spending as the best comparable operationalization. Here, we apply time-series cross-section 
analyses of 21 countries between 1995 and 2008, i.e. the period for which comparative high-quality 
data is available, and compare the effects of globalization on compensatory (unemployment) and 
social investment (education) spending. We describe the data, methods, and results of these analyses 
in the respective sections below. 
 
4. Economic globalization and public demand for welfare spending 
4.1 Research design 
The best available data to investigate the theorized relationship between economic globalization and 
individual-level policy preferences are provided in the International Social Survey Programme “Role of 
Government IV” dataset for the year 2006 (ISSP Research Group 2006). This dataset contains the 
following question: 
“Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would 
like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say 
‘much more’, it might require a tax increase to pay for it.” 
 
Eight spending areas are then listed. Out of these, we picked unemployment benefits as the one that 
covers the traditional compensation argument best and education spending as the ideal-typical social 
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investment policy. We use each of these in turn as the dependent variable in order to address the 
question whether the effects of globalization vary across compensatory and investment policies.4 
Respondents have to state their spending preference on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (spend much 
more) to 5 (spend much less). We transform this variable into a binary variable in order to simplify the 
presentation, interpretation, and readability of our results (a 1 indicates a preference for “more” or 
“much more” spending, whereas a 0 stands for “the same”, “less”, or “much less”). Substantively, it is 
plausible to assume that respondents will draw a line between a general support for spending 
increases, on the one hand, and indifference or a preference for lower spending, on the other. 
Empirically, however, we also tested other, non-dichotomized categorizations (see Section 4.3 below). 
We use multi-level logit models with country-clustered standard errors to estimate the association 
between economic globalization and attitudes. In the robustness section, we discuss alternative model 
specifications and operationalizations of the core dependent and independent variables in greater 
detail.  
We focus on one operationalization of economic globalization in the main analysis, i.e. TRADE 
OPENNESS, defined as the sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP. Previous studies have 
shown that this measure has the strongest impact on social spending compared to alternative 
measures of economic globalization such as the flow of foreign direct investments (FDI), imports from 
low-wage countries, or aggregated indices such as the KOF index of globalization (Dreher 2006). 
Nevertheless, we also test alternative indicators of globalization in the robustness section, in order to 
see whether different ‘faces’ of globalization affect attitudes differently.  
We include a number of micro-level control variables (Table A in the Online-Appendix presents 
summary descriptive statistics). INCOME, given in country-specific income deciles, is expected to be 
negatively associated with support for public spending (Meltzer/Richard 1981) as the wealthy dislike 
(paying higher taxes for) redistributive spending. With regard to education, however, the effect of 
income is less straightforward, because the redistributive effects of education are more complex and 
unclear compared to other kinds of social policies (Ansell 2008; Busemeyer 2012; Garritzmann 2015). 
The same applies to the impact of EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND: Usually, education has a negative 
effect on support for redistribution. In the case of education, however, the effect might be positive, 
because better-educated individuals recognize the value of educational investments for individual and 
societal progress. WOMEN are expected to be more supportive of public spending in general (Svallfors 
1997), although the exact causal mechanisms are still unexplored. The impact of AGE on support for 
social spending depends on the policy in question. Whereas the association should be positive for 
spending on old-age pensions and health (Busemeyer et al. 2009; Jensen 2014) and potentially 
unemployment, we expect a negative association for the case of education since older people do no 
benefit directly from increasing educational investments. Moreover, we model the effect of age in a 
non-linear fashion (including a squared term) to account for the fact that the effect of age might 
change for higher values. 
Furthermore, it is important to control for whether a respondent has CHILDREN currently in 
education. Unfortunately, the ISSP does not include this information. As a remedy, we include a 
dummy for respondents who live in a single- or two-person household, which we use as a proxy for 
“not living with children”. While this operationalization is rather indirect, it will – if anything – 
underestimate the theorized effect, because respondents might live in a single- or two-persons 
household because their children moved out to study. We also tried other operationalizations, which 
all led to the same results (see robustness section). Finally, using the definitions supplied by the ISSP 
                                                        
4
 As additional robustness tests, we also analyzed attitudes towards health care spending as a second-best operationalization 
of compensatory policies and a question on whether respondents think that it is the government’s responsibility to “create 
jobs” as an additional, albeit rough measure of social investment (active labor market policies). While the results (available on 
request) are in line with the findings reported here (i.e. globalization increases demand for ALMPs but not for health care), 
we do not report these for reasons of limited space and for theoretical reasons: Health care spending is a less clear-cut 
example of a compensatory policy than unemployment benefits. Moreover, the “government should create jobs”-question is 
not ideal, because it is not directly related to spending and because it does not unequivocally operationalize ALMPs (it could, 
e.g., equally be perceived to measure Keynesianist attitudes or simply demand for more state action). Thus, we focus on 
unemployment benefits and education spending in the main analysis. 
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data, we include categorical measures for LABOR MARKET STATUS.  
In addition to these control variables, we also tested the impact of several other rival 
explanations, e.g., respondents’ ideological position, respondents’ preferences towards public 
spending in general, and an occupation-based estimation of respondents’ risk of becoming 
unemployed due to globalization (Blinder’s (2007) and Walter’s (2010a) “offshore-ability-index”). We 
discuss these in the robustness section below; here, it suffices to say that the inclusion of these 
variables does not alter the main findings. 
On the macro-level (countries), we control for existing levels of socio-economic INEQUALITY 
(net Gini index; Solt 2009) because this has consistently been argued and found to affect preferred 
spending levels. We expect that higher levels of inequality are associated with more demand for public 
spending in line with Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Finseraas (2009). Furthermore, a well-known 
problem with the specific wording of the used ISSP questions is that they do not take into account 
existing cross-country differences in the status quo of public spending. Respondents are asked about 
their preferences for “more” or “less” spending, but not about the preferred absolute spending 
amount. As is argued by Soroka and Wlezien (2010; Wlezien 1995), existing expenditure levels can, 
however, trigger negative feedback effects, i.e. citizens are less likely to support further increases 
when spending is already high (and vice versa). Therefore, we also include the level of PUBLIC 
SPENDING in the respective field as a macro-level control variable.  
A vexing problem in the analysis of the micro-macro linkages between policy preferences and 
output is endogeneity, i.e. estimating to which degree policies affect preferences and how, in turn, 
preferences shape policy output. One possibility to solve the problem of endogeneity is to analyze the 
reciprocal interaction between preferences and output for individual country cases over time (as is 
done, for example, for three countries by Soroka and Wlezien (2010)) or to analyze exogenous shocks 
in natural experimental designs. Unfortunately, however, these approaches are much less feasible for 
broad cross-national comparisons, because due to limited data availability there is essentially a trade-
off between the number of cases that can be included in cross-sectional comparisons and the length 
of the time period under observation. The number of countries that participated in earlier Role of 
Government-waves is much smaller than in the current wave. Even in the 2006 wave, which is used in 
the present paper, the number of countries for which we have data on the important independent 
variables on the macro-level is only 17.5  
The established pragmatic solution to the endogeneity problem that we adopt here is to lag 
the core macro independent variables by five years: As the fieldwork for the survey was conducted in 
2005/06, we use data on economic globalization, inequality, and public spending in the respective 
fields from the year 2000. The time window of five years is, of course, arbitrary, but it is quite plausible 
to assume that changes in macro-level contexts will take some time to affect preferences. As a first 
robustness check, we used the 5-year average (2000-2004) in trade openness instead and found 
similar results. As a second test, we included values for the year 2005 (i.e. the year the survey was 
conducted) and did not find a significant association, which – while not being a strong causation test – 
gives us confidence in our argument about the direction of causality.  
 
4.2 Results: Demand for compensation and investment 
Tables 1 and 2 present findings of multilevel logit regressions with standard errors clustered by 
country.6 In Table 1, we focus on education spending and investigate the determinants of individual-
level support, whereas in Table 2 we analyze determinants of support for unemployment spending.  
Of crucial importance for the argument of this paper is the impact of trade openness on individual-
level support for welfare spending. When included as the only macro variable (Table 1, model 1), the 
5-year lagged level of trade openness has a positive effect on individual-level support for public 
education spending, but this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. As model 2 
shows, however, the effect turns significant as soon as we control for the level of inequality in a 
                                                        
5
 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, United States. 
6
 All estimations were conducted using Stata 13. 
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country. This indicates that inequality works as a “negative confounder” on the association between 
trade openness and preferences. Once this is accounted for, the effect of trade openness is very 
robust. The association remains robust when including the status quo in public education spending 
(model 3). Models 4 through 6 lend support to our proposition that the causal effect points from 
institutions to preferences and not the other way around, because the effects turn insignificant when 
we do not use the lagged (2000) but the contemporary (2005) levels of macro-variables.  
The magnitude of the effect is sizable: Simulating, on the basis of model 2, an increase in trade 
openness from the country with the lowest values (Japan, 21 percent of GDP) to the most open 
economy (Ireland, 184 percent of GDP), while holding the controls at their means, is associated with 
an increase in support for education spending from about 64 percent to 86 percent. Put differently, 
increasing trade openness by one standard deviation (i.e. 33 percent) above the mean (72 percent) 
increases public demand by slightly more than one standard deviation (i.e. to 76 percent). The 95-
percent confidence interval ranges from 73 to 81 percent. A similar increase in inequality by one 
standard deviation above the mean (i.e. from 30 to 34 percent), is associated with an increase in 
demand for education spending from 72 to 81 percent (the 95-percent confidence interval ranges 
from 76 to 86 percent), i.e. by almost two standard deviations. Thus, the effect of trade openness on 
individual support for more education spending is considerable, but inequality seems to have an even 
bigger effect. 
Turning to demand for unemployment benefits (Table 2), another important finding emerges: 
It is not the case that trade openness significantly increases individual-level support for 
unemployment benefits. The coefficient is positive, but the effect is not significant (in contrast to the 
one for education). This is puzzling from the perspective of compensation theory since unemployment 
benefits have been argued to be of great immediate relevance for employees, especially in times of 
economic insecurity. As the results presented in Table 2 show, however, there is no significant 
relationship between trade openness and support for more spending on unemployment. This finding 
holds irrespective of whether we include trade openness as the only determinant (Table 2, model 7) 
or in addition to inequality and/or levels of public unemployment spending and irrespective of 
whether we use time-lagged or simultaneous variables (models 8-12). 
In sum, the findings challenge ‘classical compensatory theory’ but are strongly supportive of 
our social-investment argument: Instead of increasing demand for ex-post compensation, 
globalization boosts demand for forward-looking social investments such as education.  
 The control variables perform largely as expected and confirm previous research (Ansell 2010; 
Busemeyer 2012; Busemeyer et al. 2009): The determinants of support for education spending differ 
from support for other kinds of social policies in important ways: Income and educational background 
decrease support for increased spending on unemployment, as would be expected from the Meltzer-
Richard (1981) model, but do not have a statistically significant impact on support for public education 
spending. In line with previous research, this underlines that the (re-)distributional dynamics of 
education spending are less straightforward compared to other social policy fields. 
A similarity between support for education and unemployment spending is the non-linear 
effect of age: Individuals initially tend to be more supportive of social spending, but this levels out in 
old-age. The magnitude of the squared term is, however, quite small. Women are less supportive of 
unemployment spending, but no effect appears for education. Respondents working part-time or less 
hold similar preferences to full-time workers. Not surprisingly, students and pupils are more 
supportive of increased spending on education, whereas unemployed persons favor spending on 
unemployment. Respondents living in a one- or two-person household (our proxy for having no 
children) are less likely to favor education spending, but support more spending on unemployment. 
Overall, therefore, the micro-level controls perform in line with our expectations. 
On the macro-level, confirming Finseraas (2009) and the general logic of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) 
model, high levels of socio-economic inequality increase individual-level support for more education 
and more unemployment spending. In the latter case, however, the effect is only significant in a few 
models. Model 3 and 9 include levels of public spending in the respective field to test the “thermostat 
model” (Soroka/Wlezien 2010). But the coefficients fail to reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
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 In sum, the empirical analyses support our expectations: Respondents in countries exposed to 
higher trade openness demand more public education spending. Moreover, we do not find any effect 
on demand for unemployment compensation. To underpin these findings, we now turn to a variety of 
robustness checks. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of individual-level support for more public education spending in 17 countries 
in 2005/06, multilevel logit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Individual-level variables 
Income -0.0086 -0.0088 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0082 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Female 0.0487 0.0486 0.0491 0.0487 0.0486 0.0494 
 (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377) 
Education years 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0270*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Age 0.0224*** 0.0226*** 0.0226*** 0.0224*** 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) 
Age (squared) -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
No children -0.2491*** -0.2478*** -0.2474*** -0.2490*** -0.2474*** -0.2467*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) 
Part-time 0.0915 0.0911 0.0910 0.0917 0.0919 0.0917 
 (0.0634) (0.0633) (0.0633) (0.0634) (0.0634) (0.0634) 
Less than part-time 0.0650 0.0649 0.0647 0.0652 0.0638 0.0634 
 (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0661) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0662) 
Unemployed 0.0174 0.0192 0.0196 0.0176 0.0169 0.0173 
 (0.1051) (0.1051) (0.1051) (0.1051) (0.1051) (0.1051) 
In education 0.4388*** 0.4401*** 0.4412*** 0.4392*** 0.4397*** 0.4408*** 
 (0.1355) (0.1355) (0.1355) (0.1355) (0.1355) (0.1355) 
Retired 0.0382 0.0410 0.0414 0.0384 0.0379 0.0387 
 (0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0709) (0.0709) 
Country-level variables 
Trade openness 0.0032 0.0082** 0.0078**    
(2000) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0033)  
Inequality (2000)  0.1120*** 0.1016***    
  (0.0284) (0.0312    
Public education 
spending (2000) 
  -0.1149 
(0.1544) 
   
Trade openness     0.0020 0.0037 0.0046 
(2005)    (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
Inequality (2005)     0.1074*** 0.0800* 
     (0.0386) (0.0427) 
Public education 
spending (2005) 
     -0.2246 
     (0.1762) 
Constant -0.0914 -3.8019*** -2.8797* 0.0062 -3.2024*** -1.3443 
 (0.3995) (0.9947) (1.5793) (0.4352) (1.2129) (1.8629) 
Model fit 
Log likelihood -9751.683 -9746.1459 -9745.8737 -9751.8834 -9748.6865 -9747.9104 
Rho (macro-level 
variance) 
.1113 .0606 .0587 .1136 .0803 .0737 
LR-test rho 1247.26 663.60 595.91 1250.81 797.09 688.99 
N (individual-level) 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 17,394 
N (country-level) 17 17 17 17 17 17 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Log likelihood (empty model): -10,957.039 
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Table 2: Determinants of individual-level support for unemployment spending in 17 countries in 
2005/06, multilevel logit model 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Individual-level variables 
Income -0.2011*** -0.2011*** -0.2013*** -0.2011*** -0.2011*** -0.2011*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Female -0.0763* -0.0763* -0.0764* -0.0763* -0.0763* -0.0763* 
 (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0408) 
Education years -0.0339*** -0.0339*** -0.0339*** -0.0339*** -0.0339*** -0.0339*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
Age 0.0364*** 0.0365*** 0.0365*** 0.0364*** 0.0365*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Age (squared) -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
No children 0.1410*** 0.1414*** 0.1416*** 0.1409*** 0.1418*** 0.1419*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0431) (0.0431) 
Part-time -0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0069 -0.0064 -0.0068 -0.0061 
 (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687) 
Less than part-time 0.2118*** 0.2119*** 0.2117*** 0.2120*** 0.2110*** 0.2111*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694) (0.0694) 
Unemployed 1.0701*** 1.0704*** 1.0697*** 1.0702*** 1.0694*** 1.0684*** 
 (0.1012) (0.1011) (0.1011) (0.1012) (0.1011) (0.1011) 
In education -0.0901 -0.0893 -0.0889 -0.0900 -0.0894 -0.0880 
 (0.1502) (0.1502) (0.1502) (0.1502) (0.1502) (0.1502) 
Retired -0.1388* -0.1379* -0.1384* -0.1388* -0.1390* -0.1402* 
 (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) 
Country-level variables 
Trade openness 0.0050 0.0077 0.0082    
(2000) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052)  
Inequality (2000)  0.0614 0.0895*    
  (0.0452) (0.0526)    
Public unemployment  
spending (2000) 
  0.2914 
(0.3000) 
   
Trade openness     0.0052 0.0065 0.0038 
(2005)    (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Inequality (2005)     0.0830 0.1016** 
     (0.0526) (0.0511) 
Public unemployment 
spending (2005) 
     0.3729 
     (0.2513) 
Constant -1.4153*** -3.4486** -4.6549** -1.4134*** -3.8909** -4.6615*** 
 (0.4758) (1.5665) (1.9656) (0.5179) (1.6455) (1.6357) 
Model fit 
Log likelihood -8497.4426 -8498.479 -8499.6412 -8498.2138 -8498.6723 -8499.5441 
Rho (macro-level 
variance) 
.1265 .1407 .1584 .1362 .1430 .1568 
LR-test rho 1062.02 1254.23 1493.56 961.92 1129.89 1454.96 
N (individual-level) 17,142 17,142 17,142 17,142 17,142 17,142 
N (country-level) 17 17 17 17 17 17 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Log likelihood (empty model): -9950.3566 
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4.3 Robustness 
In order to corroborate our results, we conduct a number of robustness tests. Due to space 
limitations, we report only those for preferences over education spending, in which we are mainly 
interested. The reported results for unemployment spending are equally robust and available on 
request. First, we check whether our results depend on the inclusion or exclusion of certain control 
variables by estimating models with different combinations of variables and additional control 
variables. For instance, we include respondents’ party affiliations, their general preferences towards 
public spending, and an occupation-based estimation of the likelihood of future job-loss (“offshore-
ability index”). As could be expected (Ansell 2010; Garritzmann 2015), LEFT-WING VOTERS favor more 
public education spending while RIGHT-WING VOTERS prefer less spending (Table 3, models 1a, 2a, 
3a). We abstain from including partisan variables in the main analyses above, however, as this 
considerably decreases the number of cases due to missing values and because additional problems of 
endogeneity occur (partisan identification is also associated with the other control variables in the 
model). However, including party affiliation does not alter the reported main results. 
Furthermore, one might argue that respondents’ preferences towards education spending 
might be partially explained by their PREFERENCES TOWARDS PUBLIC SPENDING IN GENERAL. While 
the fact that the effects of openness on preferences differed across policy-fields already puts some 
doubt on this, we nevertheless include a variable covering whether respondents think that 
government spending should be cut. Not surprisingly, those who favor retrenchment also favor cuts in 
education spending (Table 3, models 1b, 2b, 3b). More importantly, however, the reported results 
remain unaffected. Hence, we exclude this general spending variable, because of the theoretical and 
statistical complexities resulting from ‘explaining attitudes with attitudes’. In more general terms, 
multicollinearity does not affect our results, because the main effects remain robust irrespective of 
the variable selection and because the correlations between the included variables are relatively low.7 
Finally, we also try to control for respondents’ exposure to globalization on the individual-level by 
utilizing Blinder’s (2007) “OFFSHORE-ABILITY INDEX”, which has been commonly used in the literature. 
The index tries to capture a job’s potential to be offshored. Blinder estimates this potential by rank-
ordering occupations based on whether workers need to be present at a specific work location or not. 
This rank-ordered information is then transformed into a four-category variable, which is interpreted 
as the likelihood of future globalization-related job-loss. Walter (2010a) transfers Blinder’s index from 
its U.S.-focus to a comparative context utilizing respondents’ 4-digit ISCO-codes as provided in the 
ESS-data. We apply this index to our ISSP-data, to control for within-country effects of globalization. 
Nevertheless, we abstain from including it in the main analysis for theoretical and 
methodological reasons. Theoretically, we are interested in the macro-level association between 
economic globalization and public demand for welfare policies. Thus, as discussed above, we are 
interested in macro-level effects and hypothesize that these hold irrespective of whether we control 
on individual-level exposure or not. Moreover, the offshore-ability index is methodologically 
somewhat questionable: First, the rank-ordering and categorization of occupations is rather arbitrary, 
and second, it is based on the U.S.-case only and assumes effect-homogeneity across countries. 
Furthermore, the resulting variable is heavily right-skewed: Across all countries three-quarters of all 
workers are coded as entirely sheltered; on average only six percent are found in the highest offshore-
category. In some countries (e.g., in Canada, Finland, or France) even 98 percent of the population are 
coded as being employed in jobs with no offshore-potential.8 If only a minority is directly affected by 
globalization as this data claims, however, it is hard to imagine how this minority could be responsible 
for the large degree of public support in favor of social investment policies.  
Nevertheless, we include the offshore-ability index despite these shortcomings both in 
addition to and instead of the labor market status variables to test the robustness of our results. The 
                                                        
7
 Many correlations (Spearman resp. Pearson) are below 0.4, most below 0.1. The highest correlations were obviously 
detected between age and age-squared, and between age and the retirement-dummy. We tested these separately and the 
effects remained robust. 
8
 In the French case, this might (partly) be due to the fact that a different occupation-coding scheme is applied. For Canada 
and Finland, however, no obvious explanation for the skew is apparent and the index remains questionable when applied to 
ISSP-data. 
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reported results remain unaffected: Trade openness on the macro-level is still found to increase 
demand for education, but not for unemployment spending. Moreover, the individual offshore-
potential does not have a significant effect on respondents’ attitudes towards education spending 
(Table 3, models 1c, 1d, 1e). The same finding holds when we exclude those countries with the 
heaviest right-skew (Canada, Finland, France). 
In addition to these supplementary micro-level controls, we also test Iversen’s (2001) and 
Iversen and Cusack’s (2000) claim that it is DEINDUSTRIALIZATION rather than globalization that alters 
governments’ (and we deduce: individuals’) preferences by including the level (or 5-year change) in 
deindustrialization. However, neither levels of nor changes in deindustrialization show significant 
effects in either model as soon as we control for inequality (Table 3, models 2d, 3d, 2e, 3e), and only 
weakly significant results when deindustrialization is included as the only macro variable (Table 3, 
models 1d and 1e). Most importantly, the effect of trade openness remains unaffected by these 
changes. In sum, the findings underpin that the results are not driven by the selection of variables and 
robust to including other controls. 
 
Table 3: Testing rival explanations by including additional control variables. 
Note: The following table summarizes results of 15 separate models. The models replicate models 1 through 3 
of Table 1 and include additional control variables. To keep the table readable, we only present results for the 
variables of interest here. 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) 
Respondent voted for a left party 0.3216*** 0.3284*** 0.3292*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0486) 
Respondent voted for a right party -0.1917*** -0.1851*** -0.1850*** 
 (0.0476) 
 
(0.0476) (0.0476) 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) 
Government should cut spending -0.1212*** -0.1211*** -0.1212*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
 
 (1c) (1d) (1e) 
“Offshore-ability index” (Blinder & Walter) 0.0126 0.0133 0.0133 
 (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
 (1d) (2d) (3d) 
Level of deindustrialization (2000) -4.0502* -2.2313 -2.1467 
 (2.4209) 
 
(2.2386) (2.1781) 
 (1e) (2e) (3e) 
Change in deindustrialization (2005-2000) 16.1718 -0.4532 0.9208 
 (14.2727) 
 
(13.9640) (13.6325) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Second (and besides the inclusion of additional controls), we check whether our results are sensitive 
to the inclusion of survey weights, or whether they are biased by possibly systematic patterns of 
missing values. The results (available on request) remain unaltered. Third, we test different 
operationalizations of globalization to investigate whether the results depend on our focus on trade 
openness. To begin with, we use foreign direct investment (FDI inwards only, outwards only, and total) 
(Table 4). Using total FDI as well as inward FDI clearly confirms the reported results: The higher the 
total or inward FDI, the higher the demand for public education spending (Table 4, models 1f, 2f, 3f, 
1g, 2g, 3g). Outward FDI, in contrast, is only significant when we do not control for inequality and does 
not seem to have a robust effect (Table 4, models 1h, 2h, 3h). This seems reasonable because inward 
FDI is a lot more visible for respondents than outward FDI, although it is ironically mostly the latter 
that might put them under economic pressure. Moreover, we also use an index for the extent of 
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openness in capital account transactions (Armingeon et al. 2012). But as the variable shows hardly any 
variance across space and time for our sample (see Table A in the Online-Appendix) it is not surprising 
that we do not observe any effect (Table 4, models 1i, 2i, 3i).  
 
Table 4: Testing alternative operationalizations of globalization. 
Note: The following table summarizes 15 separate models, replicating models 1 trough 3 of Table 1. Instead of 
“trade openness”, alternative operationalizations are used. To keep the table readable, we only present results 
for the variables of interest here. (In models 1j, 2j, and 3j, we use changes in inequality and education 
spending instead of levels.) 
  
(1f) 
 
(2f) 
 
(3f) 
FDI total (2000) -0.0061 0.0239* 0.0228* 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0142) (0.0139) 
  
(1g) 
 
(2g) 
 
(3g) 
FDI inwards (2000) 0.0222 0.0528*** 0.0506*** 
(0.0234) 
 
(0.0175) (0.0179) 
  
(1h) 
 
(2h) 
 
(3h) 
FDI outwards (2000) -0.0367* -0.0062 -0.0032 
(0.0215) 
 
(0.0242) (0.0238) 
  
(1i) 
 
(2i) 
 
(3i) 
Capital account transaction “kaopen” index (2000) -0.3243 -0.1904 -0.1481 
(0.5036) 
 
(0.4213) (0.4124) 
  
(1j) 
 
(2j) 
 
(3j) 
Change in trade openness (2000-2005) 0.0251 0.0258* 0.0241 
 (0.0153) (0.0150) (0.0153) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Furthermore, we also test whether changes in trade openness instead of levels have an effect by using 
five-year differences. In two models (Table 4, models 1j and 3j), the change in trade openness slightly 
misses conventional significant levels (it is significant at an 11-percent level), while it is significant at a 
10-percent level in model 2j. Substantially, this indicates that not only the levels, but also the changes 
in trade openness influence demand for public education spending: That is, the more a country 
opened in terms of trade during the last five years before the survey, the larger the respondents’ 
demand for education spending. This is strong additional proof for our claims. 
Finally, we simultaneously include the level of trade openness and the respective FDI 
measures, as it might be the case that they have distinct independent effects on attitudes because 
they cover different aspects of globalization. However, due to the rather high correlations between 
these measures, it is unsurprising that the significance levels drop slightly, while the reported effect 
sizes remain similar (results on request). In sum, we feel confident to conclude that the results do not 
seem to be driven by a specific operationalization of globalization, but are observable for different 
measures covering several facets of globalization. 
Fourth, to make sure that the results are not driven by our decision to dichotomize the 
dependent variable, we use a different coding and dichotomize between those who are “strongly in 
favor” and all other respondents. Again, the presented findings hold, but the discriminating power of 
some variables is lower, i.e. the effect of trade openness remains highly similar, but suffers a slight loss 
in significance and size (results on request).  
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Furthermore, we use different estimation techniques: While the theoretically most suitable 
models (multilevel ordered logit) do, unfortunately, not converge in several cases due to the heavy 
left-skewedness of the data in some countries (as discussed above), we use single-level ordered logit 
models with clustered standard errors instead. Moreover, as the core assumption of ordered logit 
models, the proportional lines assumption (i.e. that the effect of the independent variables is constant 
for each answer category of the dependent variable), was violated in some cases, we also estimate 
“partial proportional odds models” (Williams 2006). In the Online-Appendix (Table C), we present and 
discuss these models and the findings in-depth. For the present purpose it suffices to summarize that 
the effect of trade openness remains robust: The coefficients of the openness variable are positive 
and significant for all answer categories, indicating that trade openness has a linear positive effect on 
education spending preferences.9 Thus, the results are not driven by our decision to dichotomize the 
dependent variable. Furthermore, the same findings occurred when using probit or multinomial 
models. 
In sum, the theorized effect of globalization on demand for public spending seems highly 
robust as it holds for different variable selections, different operationalizations of globalization, and 
across different model specifications, and is not affected by missing values or the inclusion of survey 
weights. This gives us confidence that the reported results are robust and reliable. We now turn from 
the demand-side to the supply-side of our argument. 
 
5. Economic globalization and public spending on the macro-level 
In the previous section, we analyzed the impact of economic globalization on individual-level 
preferences for increasing public unemployment and education spending. We found that trade 
openness is associated with higher demand for social investment spending (education), but not for 
compensatory policies (unemployment). Thus, as theorized, investments in education might play a 
larger role in the compensation argument than previously assumed. We now turn towards testing our 
second claim that while globalization might increase demand on the individual-level, this demand does 
not automatically transfer into policy-output. Hence, it is necessary to turn to the macro-level 
association between openness and actual policy output, i.e. here – for reasons of comparability – 
spending.10  
 
5.1 Research design 
One way of assessing the impact of public preferences on policy output is to include measures of 
public opinion as independent variables in regressions of public spending (Brooks/Manza 2006, 2007; 
Rehm 2012; Soroka/Wlezien 2010). This is feasible when studying the link between globalization and 
social spending, because macro-level data from the OECD are available from the early 1980s on. When 
analyzing education spending, however, one problem is that before the mid-1990s, there were 
significant problems with regard to the quality and comparability of spending data (Heidenheimer 
1996). Therefore, as we could not use lags for our independent variables, it does not seem advisable 
for the present paper to pursue an approach like Brooks and Manza (2006, 2007) who merge ISSP 
data with aggregate data on spending for a longer time period. Moreover, time-series individual-level 
data on education spending preferences is unavailable (an earlier ISSP-wave includes only a few 
countries). 
Instead, we directly investigate the macro-level association between trade openness and 
education spending (Table 5) as well as unemployment spending (Table 6) in time-series cross-section 
(TSCS) regressions utilizing annual public spending data. This is admittedly an imperfect solution, 
because it assumes that public demand will be the crucial mechanism that links trade openness and 
spending. But since we control for many other potential mechanisms in the regressions, this 
assumption seems defendable given the data limitations.  
                                                        
9
 To be precise, the effect decreases slightly in size over the answer categories, indicating that trade openness decreases 
opposition to additional spending more drastically than it increases support. 
10
 For some policy-fields, one could also probe other operationalizations, e.g., measures of generosity of benefits. Yet, as 
generosity measures are inexistent and unconvincing for education policies, public spending offers the most comparable 
policy-output measure. 
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In Table 5, we look at education spending and use two different dependent variables: total 
public education spending and total public tertiary education spending (both as a share of GDP). We 
add tertiary education spending, as it could be expected that the association between tertiary 
education spending and economic globalization is tighter than the association between spending on 
all levels of education and globalization, because tertiary education is closer to the labor market needs 
of employees aiming at upgrading their skills (unfortunately, more specific data on “further education” 
is not available). 
Table 6 presents analyses of the impact of trade openness on unemployment benefits as the 
prime example of traditional compensatory social policies. 
As data was available for 21 countries, we use a slightly larger country sample than in the micro-level 
analyses above (additionally including Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Greece). To ensure that the 
results are not driven by the country selection, we re-run all models with the limited sample of those 
17 countries included above. As the results for the variables of theoretical interest are the same and 
those for the control variables very similar (results on request), we report the model with the larger 
country-sample to widen the scope of the analysis and the power of the estimations. We include all 
years for which data on public education spending on all levels and on higher education spending was 
available, i.e. 1995-2008.  
Again, we face a problem of endogeneity. As an imperfect, but common-practice solution, 
independent variables are lagged by one year (we also test different lag-structures in the robustness 
section below). This seems preferable here to instrumental variable (IV) regressions, since convincing 
and valid instruments are hard to find in the case of analyses of country-level aggregate data. As the 
methodological debate in the TSCS literature is still ongoing and has not agreed on a ‘best estimation 
technique’, we present results of several model specifications for each dependent variable: 
generalized least squares (GLS) models with an AR(1) correction for serial correlation in the error 
term, models that include a lagged dependent variable, and models with country fixed effects. All 
models use panel-corrected standard errors to correct for contemporaneous correlation among units 
and unit-specific heteroskedasticity (Beck/Katz 1995). 
Besides trade openness, we include a set of common controls (Table B in the Online-Appendix 
contains operationalizations and descriptive statistics): The CABINET SHARE OF LEFT PARTIES is 
expected to a have a positive effect on education spending and on welfare spending (Ansell 2010; 
Busemeyer 2007; Schmidt 2007). The population SHARE OF THE ELDERLY, in contrast, is hypothesized 
to have a negative coefficient, since older people – as the reported results above underlined – are less 
likely to support education spending (Busemeyer et al. 2009). DEINDUSTRIALIZATION (i.e. the share of 
employment in the service sector) has been identified as a major determinant of increasing social 
spending (Iversen 2001; Iversen/Cusack 2000) and is therefore likely to be associated with higher 
levels of education spending as well. Finally, we include a measure of the SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
(public spending as percentage of GDP), which is obviously also expected to have a positive 
coefficient. 
 
5.2 Findings 
We first focus on determinants of education spending and then turn towards unemployment benefits. 
In our first two models on education spending (Table 5, models A and B), the control variables perform 
largely as expected: A large public sector and high levels of service-sector employment are positively 
and significantly associated with public education spending. In contrast, a larger population share of 
the elderly has a negative effect. We do not find evidence for significant short-term partisan effects. 
This is in line with previous research emphasizing the long-term impact of partisan power over its 
short-term consequences (Busemeyer 2007) but might also have methodological reasons as we use 
annual observation data – because globalization can change on a yearly basis – and not government-
terms as the unit of analysis (Garritzmann/Seng 2016). Moreover, most control variables do not show 
coherent effects across model specifications, casting doubt on the robustness of the effects. Including 
lagged dependent variables (model C and D) or fixed effects (models E and F) causes many variables to 
turn insignificant. 
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Most importantly for the argument of this paper, trade openness does not have a robust 
effect on public education spending: In most of the models, there is no significant association between 
openness and education spending. We find a significant, positive association only when we focus on 
tertiary education spending and a specific model specification (using AR(1) instead of a lagged 
dependent variable) (Table 5, model B). In model 5, the estimate even turns negative – but is not 
statistically significant. 
In sum, trade openness does not seem to have a robust effect on education spending, neither 
a positive one (as theorized by compensation theory), nor a negative one (as theorized by efficiency 
theory) (for a similar assessment for a country sample of 119 developed and developing countries see 
also Benarroch and Pandey (2012)). 
 For the case of unemployment benefits the compensation argument would lead us to expect a 
strong positive association: Higher levels of openness should be associated with higher levels of 
spending, because job-loss compensation is immediately relevant for workers exposed to the vagaries 
of international markets. Table 6 suggests, however, that the effect of trade openness on public 
unemployment benefits is negative: The signs of the coefficients are always negative, indicating that – 
in contrast to compensation theory but in line with efficiency theory – globalization decreases 
unemployment spending. The estimation are, however, only significant once we include country fixed 
effects (Model I). That is, only when focusing on within-country variation do we find that countries 
opening up their economies on average also decrease unemployment spending. This supports one of 
our central arguments: Even if globalization increases the demand for some welfare spending, it might 
simultaneously constrain governments’ capacity to fulfill these demands, as the demands are not 
automatically met.  
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Table 5: Determinants of public education spending (as percentage of GDP), 1995-2008, 21 democracies 
 
 
 
Public education spending on… 
all levels higher education all levels higher education all levels higher education 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Lagged educ. spending, all levels   0.9546***    
  (0.0274)    
Lagged educ. spending, higher education    0.9144***   
   (0.0302)   
Trade openness (t-1) 0.0028 0.0017** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0018 
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0016) 
Cabinet share left parties (t-1) 0.0012 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Population share of elderly (t-1) -0.0855*** -0.0372*** 0.0033 0.0011 -0.0319 0.0070 
(0.0278) (0.0114) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0199) (0.0095) 
Deindustrialization (t-1) 1.8344* 1.0061*** -0.0568 0.0295 -1.3858 -0.1840 
(0.9688) (0.3093) (0.2073) (0.0969) (1.3880) (0.5293) 
Total public spending (t-1) 0.0424*** 0.0115*** 0.0014 0.0017* 0.0376*** 0.0089*** 
(0.0080) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0087) (0.0030) 
Constant 3.0294*** 0.3492 0.1096 -0.0342 4.5397*** 0.7071** 
(0.8916) (0.2928) (0.1947) (0.0911) (0.9125) (0.3428) 
Method dealing with serial correlation? AR(1) AR(1) LDV LDV AR (1) AR (1) 
Country fixed-effects? No No No No Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.77 0.49 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.71 
Observations 373 372 371 369 373 372 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Determinants of public spending on unemployment benefits (as percentage of GDP), 1995-
2008, 21 democracies. 
 
 (G) (H) (I) 
Lagged unemployment spending  0.9593***  
 (0.0254)  
Trade openness (t-1) -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0103*** 
(0.0027) (0.0005) (0.0036) 
Cabinet share left parties (t-1) -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0001 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Population share of elderly (t-1) -0.0636** -0.0040 0.0039 
(0.0268) (0.0078) (0.0223) 
Deindustrialization (t-1) 0.4668 -0.5430*** -1.0725 
(1.0356) (0.2061) (1.1726) 
Total public spending (t-1) 0.0619*** 0.0028 0.0689*** 
(0.0095) (0.0021) (0.0093) 
Constant -0.8096 0.3573* -0.3063 
(0.9012) (0.1902) (0.8363) 
Method dealing with serial correlation? AR(1) LDV AR(1) 
Country fixed-effects? No No Yes 
R
2
 0.35 0.95 0.78 
Observations 377 376 377 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
5.3 Robustness 
In order to underpin these findings, we run several robustness checks; again we only report those for 
education spending for reasons of limited space – the results for unemployment spending are similarly 
robust and available on request. First, we test alternative operationalizations of globalization (as 
above: FDI outwards, FDI inwards, total FDI, and the capital account openness index). All indicators 
confirm the reported findings: Economic globalization, irrespective of the operationalization, does not 
seem to have a robust effect on public education spending in the period under scrutiny, as the 
significance levels, effect sizes, and even the signs of coefficient estimates flip across model 
specifications.  
Second, a critical reader might object that the effects of openness on spending should be 
mediated by government partisanship. In other words: Maybe trade openness does not have a direct 
effect on spending, but an indirect one through left parties in government. To probe this possibility, 
we estimate models excluding the trade openness variable and the partisan variable in turn. 
Moreover, we test for an interaction between both variables. However, we find a significant effect of 
trade openness only in one of twelve model specifications – which, moreover, even points in the 
‘wrong’ direction (results on request). 
Third, we use longer lags for the independent variables (two to five years), as it might be the 
case that the effect of openness needs more time to materialize. The results, however, do not support 
this reasoning, as the effects are highly similar, or even less significant. Hence, it is not the case that 
we ‘miss’ the effect of openness by choosing the common one-year lags. Similarly, we investigate 
whether including year fixed-effects alters the results to test, for example, whether common shocks 
across countries drive the results. This is not the case. 
Fourth, we test whether including GDP GROWTH alters the results, as some scholars have 
argued it should be included when other measures are calculated relative to GDP. GDP growth does 
not significantly affect education spending, but significantly decreases spending on unemployment. 
More importantly for the argument of this paper, including GDP growth does not make the effect of 
globalization more coherent. Therefore, excluding GDP growth seems well justified, as the main 
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finding is still the same: There is no uniform systematic effect of globalization on government 
spending once we distinguish between different policy fields. 
Finally, when predicting unemployment spending, we also added the STANDARDIZED 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE as an additional control. This variable has – as could be expected – a strong 
and significant effect. More importantly, however, it does not alter the effect of trade openness.   
In sum, the robustness tests show that our results are not driven by the selection of methods, 
operationalizations, inclusion of specific variables, or the choice of particular lag-structure. Overall, 
there is no systematic association between globalization and public spending on either education or 
unemployment benefits. That is, although economic globalization increases demand for social 
investment, it does not translate into larger social investment spending. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Two seemingly contradicting theories make claims on effects of globalization on welfare states. 
Compensation theory argues that globalization enhances economic insecurities, which in turn increase 
public welfare demand, particularly unemployment benefits. Governments are hypothesized to 
respond to this demand by expanding the welfare state. Efficiency theory, in contrast, argues that the 
mobility of capital in a globalized economy puts pressure on governments to cut back on taxes and – 
consequently – (social) spending. Empirical evidence on these rival claims is inconclusive. 
This article tried to sketch out a possible reconciliation of these conflicting expectations. First, we 
argued that the two theories are less contradicting than usually assumed, when the supply and the 
demand side of policy-making are disentangled. While we are not the first to notice this possibility 
(see Brady et al. 2007; Cerny 1997; Genschel 2004; Hays 2009; Rodrik 1997), it is not prominent in the 
literature so far and – more importantly – has hitherto not been systematically tested. Combining 
survey analyses of individual-level preferences and time-series cross-section regressions on policy 
output, we indeed found that economic globalization increases demand for (some kinds of) welfare 
policies, but that there is no robust association between globalization and the supply-side of policy-
making, i.e. public spending. In sum, globalization increases the demand for but not the supply of 
social policies. 
This finding contradicts recent contributions to the field (Brooks/Manza 2006, 2007; Rehm 
2012; Soroka/Wlezien 2010) that find policy output to be roughly in line with popular preferences. A 
full challenge of the “social policy by popular demand” hypothesis (Rehm 2012) requires more 
extensive and more careful analysis beyond the scope of the present paper by, for example, including 
measures of public opinion on the left hand side of the macro-level regressions, which was unfeasible 
here for data availability reasons. Nevertheless, our findings do suggest that the link between 
individual preferences and policy output is less straightforward than often assumed. 
The second and more innovative contribution of this paper is that we expanded the scope of 
the debate on the globalization-welfare nexus by emphasizing the role of social investments relative to 
traditional compensatory social policies. We argued that individuals faced with the challenges of 
globalization are more likely to demand increased public investments in human capital (in order to 
prevent unemployment and job offshoring ex ante) rather than demanding to be compensated for 
income losses ex post as the bulk of existing literature expects. Identifying the exact causal mechanism 
is difficult due to data limitations, but our analyses revealed that the association between globalization 
and demand for education spending is much clearer than the one between globalization and demand 
for increased spending on unemployment, although the latter would come closer to the classical 
compensation argument. Instead of compensation, people demand social investments. 
Bringing these findings together, our results suggest a systematic ‘democratic mismatch’ 
between popular demand and policy output. A pessimistic interpretation of our results could 
emphasize that if the globalization-induced increases in demand for compensation is not met by 
increased public supply by policy-makers (at least in the long run), more and more voters might be 
disappointed by their governments or even by democracy in general. The amply documented crisis of 
democracy that manifests itself in lower levels of public trust in the institutions of representative 
democracy, declining political participation, increases in anti-democratic sentiments, and the rise of 
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populist parties throughout Europe seem to point in this direction. This scenario is especially 
worrisome in light of expectations that global internationalization is likely to continue in the future. 
A more optimistic interpretation of the results could object that the public is well informed 
about the constraining effects of globalization on government capacity. For instance, public opinion 
data shows that about three-quarters of all respondents across Europe believe that national 
governments are not the best-suited actor to “get the effects of globalization under control” 
(Christensen 2010: 11). Furthermore, Hellwig and Samuels (2007: 298) find “strong support for the 
claim that globalization attenuates accountability linkages between voters and elected officials”. 
Voters in more open economies are less likely to reward or sanction their governments for economic 
performance (Hellwig et al. 2008). Hence, it might be the case that the ‘democratic mismatch’ 
between demand for and supply of welfare does not automatically translate into higher levels of 
political discontent. Whether the ‘pessimistic’ or the ‘optimistic’ scenario (or none of them) are 
appropriate remains to be seen.  
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Online-Appendix 
 
Online-Appendix Figure A: Respondents’ preferences over public education spending across countries. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on ISSP RoG 2006 data (see text for details). 
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Online-Appendix Table A: Descriptive statistics for variables used in survey analyses. 
Variable, Source, Operationalization N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Micro-level variables (Source: ISSP 2006): 
Education spending preference, (“V20”) 19372 .7104 .4536 0 1 
Unemployment spending preference, (“V23”) 19072 .2775 .4478 0 1 
Income, in country deciles 19890 3.3867 2.2551 1 10 
Gender (female) 19964 .5057 .5000 0 1 
Education (years) 18564 12.7671 4.1244 1 65 
Age (years) 19892 48.5462 16.5843 15 97 
Full-time worker, “WRKST” 19671 .5251 .4994 0 1 
Part-time worker, “WRKST” 19671 .1059 .3078 0 1 
Less than part-time worker, “WRKST” 19671 .1095 .3123 0 1 
Unemployed, “WRKST” 19671 .0321 .1762 0 1 
In education, “WRKST” 19671 .0367 .1880 0 1 
Retired, “WRKST” 19671 .1907 .3929 0 1 
No children, “HOMPOP” = 1 or 2 persons 19718 .5359 .4987 0 1 
Micro-level variables included in robustness section (Source: ISSP 2006): 
No children (alternative operationalization), “HHCYCLE” 
= 1 or 2 persons 
19573 .5212 .4996 0 1 
Party vote (left), “PARTY_LR”, voted for a left or far-left 
party 
17698 .3370 .4727 0 1 
Party vote (right), “PARTY_LR”, voted for a right or far-
right party 
17698 .2790 .4485 0 1 
Should government cur spending?, “V11” 18878 2.6037 1.2169 0 4 
Offshore-ability index (Walter 2010a) 17817 18.4618 29.2760 0 100 
Country-level variables (Source: OECD Stats, if not indicated otherwise) 
Level of trade openness (2000), (Imports + Exports) / 
GDP 
20023 71.5490 32.7974 20.52 184.01 
Level of trade openness (2005), (Imports + Exports) / 
GDP 
20023 68.8095 29.0180 26.49 150.70 
5-year change in trade openness, Level of trade 
openness 2005 – level of trade openness 2000 
20023 -2.7395 8.7638 -33.31 10.52 
Level of inequality (2000), (SWIID, Version 3.1), net Gini  20023 29.7010 4.1908 22.5 36.8 
Level of inequality (2005), (SWIID, Version 3.1), net Gini  20023 28.9481 3.3786 23.60 35.93 
Level of public education spending all levels (2000) 20023 5.0711 .7998 3.50 6.40 
Level of public education spending all levels (2005) 20023 4.9985 .8659 3.40 6.80 
Level of deindustrialization (2000) 20023 .6890 .0609 .53 .77 
Change in deindustrialization (2005-2000) 20023 .0267 .0104 .01 .05 
Total foreign direct investment (2000) 20023 16.3672 10.8090 .84 36.27 
Total foreign direct investment (2005) 20023 8.2206 5.7892 1.06 25.38 
Inwards foreign direct investment (2000) 20023 7.9177 6.2708 .176 26.46 
Inwards foreign direct investment (2005) 20023 3.4538 3.0459 .06 14.35 
Outwards foreign direct investment (2000) 20023 8.4495 6.6743 .67 19.73 
Outwards foreign direct investment (2005) 20023 4.7668 4.2336 .29 19.26 
Capital account transactions Index (2000), Armingeon et 
al. 2012 
20023 2.2875 .4408 1.13 2.46 
Capital account transactions Index (2000), Armingeon et 
al. 2012 
20023 2.2875 .4408 1.13 2.46 
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Online-Appendix Table B: Descriptive statistics for variables used in time-series cross-section analyses. 
Source: OECD Stats if not indicated otherwise. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Public education spending, all levels, as a share of GDP 374 5.1705 .9238 2.40 7.70 
Public education spending, tertiary education, as a share of 
GDP 
373 1.1010 .3312 .30 2.20 
Total public spending, as a share of GDP  420 45.7313 7.7894 30.30 71.72 
Level of trade openness (2000), (Imports + Exports) / GDP 420 70.4284 33.9932 16.11 184.31 
Capital account transactions Index, Armingeon et al. 2012 393 2.1905 .6894 -1.14 2.50 
Inwards foreign direct investment 403 3.1812 4.1769 .00 38.15 
Outwards foreign direct investment 401 3.7635 4.1784 .11 43.48 
Cabinet seat share of left parties, Armingeon et al. 2012 420 36.6609 38.6122 0 100 
Share of the elderly (+ 65) 420 15.0804 2.2372 10.85 22.75 
Deindustrialization = share of employment in the service 
sectors = 1 – (share of manufacturing + share agriculture) 
420 .6807 .0670 .46 .81 
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Online Appendix Table C: Determinants of individual-level preferences towards public education 
spending in 17 countries in 2005/06, partial proportional odds model. 
 
 Spend less, the 
same as now, 
more, or much 
more (=1).  
Much less (= 0). 
Spend the same 
as now, more, or 
much more (=1).  
Less, or much less 
(= 0). 
Spend more, or 
much more (=1).  
Much less, less, or 
the same as now 
(= 0). 
Spend much 
more (=1).  
Much less, less, 
the same as 
now, or more (= 
0). 
Individual-level variables 
Income 0.2316*** 0.0589 0.0040 -0.0166 
 (0.0825) (0.0535) (0.0222) (0.0152) 
Female 0.9186*** 0.5060*** 0.0822 0.0802* 
 (0.2068) (0.1456) (0.0518) (0.0467) 
Education (years) -0.0208 -0.0190 0.0129 0.0241** 
 (0.0474) (0.0156) (0.0080) (0.0108) 
Age 0.0199** 
(0.0082)  
Age (squared) -0.0002*** 
(0.0001)  
No children 0.7141*** -0.2619** -0.2102*** -0.1634** 
 (0.2288) (0.1264) (0.0724) (0.0701) 
Part-time worker 0.0243 
(0.0656)  
Less than part-time 0.0996 
(0.0652)  
Unemployed 0.1064 
(0.0996)  
In education 0.0459 1.6828** 0.4049* 0.2007 
 (1.0441) (0.6564) (0.2305) (0.1946) 
Retired 0.1311 
(0.1030)  
Country-level variables 
Trade openness (2000) 0.0279*** 0.0199*** 0.0078* 0.0051** 
(0.0101) (0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0026) 
Inequality (2000) 0.0909*** 
(0.0320) 
Public education 
spending (2000) 
-0.2338 
(0.1776) 
Constant 0.6544 0.4726 -1.6867 -3.6209* 
 (2.2752) (1.8899) (2.0598) (1.9977) 
Model fit 
N 17,394 
Log pseudolikelihood -19550.523 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0298 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category for labor market status 
dummies is full-time employment. For those variables, where the ordered logit assumption held, only 
one coefficient is shown for all categories (e.g., “age”) and can be interpreted as an ordered logit 
coefficient. For those variables, which violated the assumption, different coefficients for each answer 
category are shown (e.g., “income”). For interpretation of partial proportional odds models see 
description in text above and Williams (2006). 
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Interpretation of Table C (Online-Appendix): 
A well-known and common weakness of ordered logit models is, that this assumption is often violated. 
This was also the case for our sample. The two standard solutions to this problem are to either ignore 
this shortcoming and still report the results, or to abstain from using ordered logit models by using 
multinomial or generalized ordered logit models instead. 
As a more convincing solution, we used a partial proportional odds model.11 This model 
relaxes the proportional odds assumption for those variables, which violate it, but keeps it for those 
variables, which do not violate the assumption. Put simply, a partial proportional odds model is an 
ordered logit model for those variables, which meet the proportional odds assumption, and a series of 
logit models for those variables, which do not meet the assumption. The main advantage of the model 
is that it uses more of the available information as (in contrast to logit) all answer categories are used 
and (in contrast to multinomial models) the fact that the answer categories are ordered is taken into 
account. The interpretation of the coefficients is slightly different than in logit models: The coefficients 
of those variables, for which the ordered logit assumption holds, can be interpreted as standard 
ordered logit coefficients. When the assumption is violated, the model estimates a series of logit 
models. For these, positive coefficients indicate that the variable increases the likelihood that a 
respondent is in a higher answer category than the current. Negative coefficients, vice versa, mean 
that the respondent is likely to be in the current or a lower category on the answer scale. 
Results of the partial proportional odds model, using the same variable specification as model 
3 in Table 1, are presented in Table C.12  Again, the effect of trade openness remains robust: the 
coefficients of the openness variable are positive and significant for all answer categories, which 
indicates that trade openness has an almost linear positive effect on education spending preferences. 
This justifies our decision to dichotomize the dependent variable to facilitate interpretation. To be 
precise, the effect decreases slightly in size over the answer categories, indicating that trade openness 
decreases opposition to more spending more drastically than it increases support. In any case, 
however, this indicates that trade openness has the theorized effect and the results are not driven by 
our decision to dichotomize the dependent variable. 
                                                        
11 We estimate these using Stata’s “gologit2“-ado with the “autofit“-option (Williams 2006). 
12
 The model reveals why we do not find an effect of gender on education policy preferences: Gender indeed does have an 
effect, but it is not linear across all answer categories (indicated by the decreasing sizes and changing significance levels of 
the effect): Women are significantly less likely than men to oppose education spending. For the third answer category, which 
discriminates between “more spending” vs. “the same or less” (just as our main analyses above have done), however, this 
effect disappears. In other words, women are less likely than men to state extreme positions on public education spending. 
In a similar vein, the model shows that income indeed does have an effect, as soon as we investigate the answers across 
answer categories: the higher a respondent’s reported income, the less likely that she will favor “much less” spending. In 
other words: especially poorer respondents seem to tick the option “much less education spending”. We abstain from 
discussing this surprising finding in-depth, but strongly encourage future research to address this relationship in more detail. 
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